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Abstract—Among the various market structures under peer-
to-peer energy sharing, one model based on cooperative game
theory provides clear incentives for prosumers to collaboratively
schedule their energy resources. The computational complexity
of this model, however, increases exponentially with the number
of participants. To address this issue, this paper proposes the
application of K-means clustering to the energy profiles following
the grand coalition optimization. The cooperative model is run
with the “clustered players” to compute their payoff allocations,
which are then further distributed among the prosumers within
each cluster. Case studies show that the proposed method can
significantly improve the scalability of the cooperative scheme
while maintaining a high level of financial incentives for the
prosumers.
Index Terms—clustering, K-means, cooperative game theory,
nucleolus, energy management, P2P, energy storage
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I. INTRODUCTION
K-means clustering is investigated in this paper as a means
to address the computational issues embedded in the cooper-
ative game theoretical model proposed in [1], which provides
a framework to financially reward efficient collaboration of
distributed energy resources (DER).
As a result of the fast increase in DER and recent devel-
opment in smart grid technologies, peer-to-peer (P2P) energy
sharing or trading is widely proposed as a market mechanism
[2] to engage prosumers, proactive-consumers with distributed
energy resources that actively control their energy behaviors.
DER control strategies that incorporate optimal scheduling
of energy storage (ES) have been heavily researched in mi-
crogrid applications where all of the participants align their
interests with the microgrid [3]. However, it is not necessarily
the case that all prosumers can achieve their lowest energy
costs individually while minimizing the joint energy cost.
Therefore, it is important to study the strategic interactions
among prosumers when designing local energy trading and
sharing mechanisms.
Game theory is widely used in recent literature to link
prosumers’ energy behavior to their economic outcome. One
typical example is the usage of non-cooperative game theory in
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energy sharing among prosumers, who strategically schedule
their DER according to the dynamic dual prices [4]. However,
this scheme relies on the assumption that no prosumers have
market power as dynamic dual prices can be interpreted as
competitive energy prices, introducing potential instability
to the practice [5]. Besides, the allocation of the financial
benefit to each prosumer may be unclear or suboptimal on
the individual level [1].
Cooperative game theory, on the other hand, details a
clear profit allocation method that rewards collaboration, and
analyzes the fairness of profit allocation from each individual
player’s perspective [6]. An energy sharing model that incorpo-
rates ES optimization was developed using cooperative game
theory in [1], with the proof that the profit can be allocated
in a way that ensures a satisfactory economic outcome for all
prosumers in this P2P energy sharing scheme. However, the
model’s computational intensity remains a hindering factor due
to the large number of linear optimization problems (o(2N )
where N is the number of players) required.
This paper aims to address this computational challenge.
Sampling algorithms have been developed for cases where
the Shapley value [7] is selected as the payoff allocation
method [8]. However, the Shapley value for this cooperative
P2P energy sharing scheme is proven in [1] to be sometimes
non-stabilizing, meaning that some prosumers may have an
incentive to leave the grand coalition to form smaller coalitions
for higher profits, leading to inefficient utilization of their
collective energy storage capacity. The nucleolus, despite be-
ing stabilizing for this application, is calculated by iteratively
minimizing all possible coalitions’ excesses [9], introducing
another intractable step into the model.
Under the cooperative theoretical scheme, the profit allo-
cation is directly linked to each player’s contribution to the
coalitions, which is measured by how much a player’s own
energy behavior can offset the inefficiencies in the coalitional
energy usage. Therefore, we consider grouping customers with
similar load patterns into joint players in order to limit the
number of possible coalitions, thus reducing the required num-
ber of linear optimization problems. Energy profile clustering
has been extensively used to study the customer load patterns
[10]–[12]. One common objective among these works is using
typical load patterns to inform the setting of tariff structures,
but they have not considered the flexibility of storage, or
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analyzed the added cost savings of a certain load profile to
a cooperative group, which is the determining factor in a
prosumer’s profit allocation.
We propose, in this paper, the novel concept of “clustered
players”, who are grouped by applying K-means to their load
profiles under the cooperative energy management scenario.
We run the cooperative game model with just the “clustered
players” instead of all the participating prosumers, signifi-
cantly reducing the number of linear problems. The payoff
allocation for the “clustered players” can then be further
distributed among their member prosumers. Finally, We use
case studies to demonstrate the significant improvement in the
model’s scalability and a similar level of financial incentives
for the prosumers using the proposed method. It is thus a good
benchmark for future development of customized clustering
methods for the cooperative P2P energy sharing scheme.
II. COOPERATIVE GAME FORMULATION
In order to formulate the collaboration of different pro-
sumers as a cooperative game, we need to answer three
key questions: 1) how do prosumers collaborate? 2) how do
we quantify the value of this collaboration? and 3) how do
we allocate the benefit gained through collaboration to each
individual player? The following three subsections provide
detailed discussions on these questions.
A. Cooperative Energy Management
Energy cost savings are achieved through scheduling flexi-
ble energy resources, usually energy storage (ES) systems, to
benefit from time-of-use (ToU) energy pricing and dual energy
pricing, in which retail contracts pay prosumers less for excess
generation than they charge for energy usage [13].
Under the assumption that the retail supplier offers a lower
export tariff (e.g. feed-in tariff) than it charges for buying
electricity, prosumers can save money by storing the excess PV
generation in the ES system and using it when the generation
is less than they need. The concept of an energy coalition was
proposed in [14], where a group of prosumers collaboratively
operate their ES systems to minimize the total group energy
cost. Let a group of N prosumers form grand coalition N
indexed by i ∈ N := {1, 2, ..., N}. A coalition is any subset
S ⊆ N . Assuming R timesteps (t = 1, 2, ..., R) with a time
interval of ∆t, the total energy cost for a coalition S can be
written as a function of all its members’ ES operations:
FS(b) =
R∑
t=1
{
pbt
∑
i∈S
[qit + bit]
+ + pst
∑
i∈S
[qit + bit]
−
}
where [x]+(−) = max(min){x, 0}. qit, in [kWh], denotes
prosumer i’s net energy consumption (positive) or generation
(negative) without ES at time t, bit, in [kWh], denotes pro-
sumer i’s ES system’s charge (positive) or discharge (negative)
energy variables at time t, and pbt and p
s
t , in [£/kWh], denote
the electricity import and export prices at time t.
The coalitional energy cost for S is then defined as the
lowest total energy cost achievable by optimizing the operation
of all the ES systems within S at the same time:
C(S) = min
b
FS(b) (1)
s.t. bi ≤ bit ≤ bi, ∀i ∈ S,∀t ∈ [1, R] (2)
0 ≤ eiSoC0i +
k∑
t=1
([bit]
+ηini + [bit]
−/ηouti ) ≤ ei,
∀i ∈ S,∀r ∈ [1, R] (3)
R∑
t=1
([bit]
+ηini + [bit]
−/ηouti ) = 0, ∀i ∈ S (4)
where each prosumer i’s ES system has an energy capacity of
ei, in [kWh], charge limit bi and discharge limit bi over ∆t,
in [kWh], charge efficiency ηini and discharge efficiency η
out
i ,
and initial state of charge SoC0i .
The ES power constraint, energy constraint, and cycle
constraint are expressed respectively in (2), (3), and (4). The
piecewise components of this optimization problem can be
rewritten in a linearized format detailed in [14].
The coalitional energy cost through solving (1) then serves
as a basis to evaluate the value of each energy coalition.
B. Value of Energy Coalitions
For each energy coalition S we assign a value function
v(S), defined as the energy cost savings by forming S, in other
words, the difference between the sum of the energy costs of
each prosumer in S with ES systems scheduled individually,
and the coalitional energy cost of S with all the ES systems
scheduled collaboratively:
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
C({i})− C(S)
The pair (N , v) defines our prosumer cooperative game,
and the value of the grand coalition v(N ) denotes the total
amount of payoffs we can award to the prosumers.
C. Payoff Allocation
Having calculated the total amount of payoffs available, the
next step is to determine how to allocate it to each prosumer.
Definition 1 (Imputation): We use vector x as the payoff
allocation, and its entry xi represents the payment to prosumer
i ∈ N . x is said to be an imputation if it meets both the
Efficiency and Individual Rationality criteria:
1) Efficiency:
∑
i∈N xi = v(N ).
2) Individual Rationality: xi ≥ v({i}),∀i ∈ N .
The efficiency criterion guarantees the sum of all payoff allo-
cations equals the grand coalition’s energy cost savings, and
the individual rationality criterion requires all the prosumers
are better off cooperating in the grand coalition.
However, an imputation does not guarantee everyone being
satisfied in the grand coalition, as some players may be able to
achieve higher payoffs by forming smaller energy coalitions.
Definition 2 (Excess): We measure an energy coalition’s
dissatisfaction with respect to the imputation x by its excess
defined as ε(x,S) = v(S)−∑i∈S xi.
If ε(x,S) > 0, then S is better off on its own and can offer
higher payoffs to its members than the grand coalition.
The nucleolus u, the imputation with lexicographically
minimal excesses that minimizes the dissatisfaction of the
players [15], is proven in [1] to be stabilizing for our prosumer
cooperative game, ensuring ε(u,S) ≤ 0,∀S ⊆ N .
The significance of this cooperative game theoretic approach
is that it offers a way to encourage DER collaboration while
ensuring that all players are financially incentivized to remain
in the energy grand coalitions. A key limitation, however, is
the computational complexity which increases exponentially
with the number of prosumers. The following section explores
the potential of clustering in addressing this problem.
III. PROSUMER CLUSTERING
The scalability of this cooperative game model is mainly
limited by two groups of computation steps: 1) cost minimiza-
tion for all 2N coalitions to calculate the coalitional energy
costs, and 2) excess minimization for all 2N coalitions to
calculate the nucleolus. All optimization problems in each step
are linear and tractable, but it is the sheer number of linear
problems in each step that proves intractable as it increases
exponentially with the number of players.
We identified clustering as a means to reduce the number of
coalitions, hence the number of linear optimization problems
required. Clustering seeks to group similarities and separate
differences among its subjects, which we define as prosumer
load patterns in our cooperative game. This matches well with
our objective to allocate payoffs to the prosumers based on the
contribution they make to each coalition, which is measured
by their capacity to offset the net consumption or generation
of the rest of the coalition.
A. K-Means Clustering
Various clustering algorithms have been used and compared
in identifying load patterns, most commonly to inform the
setting of tariff structures. However, these are not necessarily
suitable for partitioning prosumers in a cooperative energy
management scheme. As a benchmark, this paper incorpo-
rates a simple K-means clustering algorithm in the prosumer
cooperative game as an attempt to reduce the full game’s
computational complexity.
In implementing K-means clustering, some initial seed
selections can lead to local optimal solutions [16]. In this
paper, we choose 24 hours as the model timespan and half-
hourly energy consumption values as the clustering features.
Due to the low number of features (i.e. 48 features for one
day) and the small sample size (i.e. ≤ 200 prosumers), we
could simply apply a random initialization and run the K-
means model 1000 times without significantly impacting the
computational time. An important benefit of this approach is
that we could compare all the K-means results and select the
final clusters based on additional criteria. As the selection
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Fig. 1. Total Euclidean distances for 1000 K-means (k=8) clustering runs on
50 energy profiles
of K is limited by the computational complexity, we would
like the prosumers as evenly represented in the clusters as
possible. Therefore, we choose the total Euclidean distance
of each K-means model’s result as a metric, and identify a
set of clustering results that have the lowest total Euclidean
distances by setting a selection upper bound as 1% above the
lowest total Euclidean distance of all runs. All the clustering
results that fall within the relaxed range of total Euclidean
distance can then be compared against each other, and the
one with the most even distribution of prosumers is selected. A
detailed description of implementing this K-means clustering
technique is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Cluster Assignment (input: profiles, k)
function KMEANS(m, k)
(cluster prof.) p← arg minP
∑k
j=1
∑
m∈Pj‖m−pj‖
2
(total Euclidean dist.) D ←∑kj=1∑m∈Pj‖m− pj‖
(cluster sizes) P∗ : P ∗j ← count of m ∈ Pj ,∀j ∈ [1, k]
(cluster assignment) G : Gi ← j if mi ∈ Pj ,∀i
return p, D,P∗,G
(total K-means runs) runmax← 1000
(prosumer load profiles) prof
(total Euclidean dist. selection relaxation) eurelax← 1%
for r in [1, runmax] do
c[r],EU[r],C∗[r],M[r]← KMEANS(prof, k)
eumin← min(EU),minr← arg min (EU)
ca ← c[minr],C∗a ← C∗[minr],Ma ←M[minr]
for r in [1, runmax] do
if EU[r] ≤ eumin ∗ (1 + eurelax) then
if min(C∗[r]) > min(C∗a) then
ca ← c[r],C∗a ← C∗[r],Ma ←M[r]
else if min(C∗[r]) = min(C∗a) then
if max(C∗[r]) < max(C∗a) then
ca ← c[r],C∗a ← C∗[r],Ma ←M[r]
return C∗a,Ma
Fig. 1 shows an example of the Euclidean distance variation
as a result of clustering 50 prosumer load profiles. It can be
seen than at least 20 out of 1000 clustering runs produce a
total Euclidean distance within the allowed range. To have this
adjusted K-means algorithm provides the flexibility to apply
additional screening methods to the selection of prosumer
clusters.
B. Cooperative Game with Clustered Players
After the clustering method is finalized, we still need
to decide which set of energy profiles to apply clustering
to. Because the prosumer cooperative game focuses on the
contributions of each player to the coalitions, we select the net
load profiles under the cooperative grand coalition scenario
as the clustering subjects. This means we need to run the
cooperative energy management model for the grand coalition
with all of the N players first before clustering can be applied.
The purpose of clustering in this paper is to reduce the
number of modeled players in the cooperative game model.
Therefore, we define each cluster of prosumers as a clustered
player clj , and the model becomes a K-player cooperative
game, where K is the input number of clusters for K-means.
We then have clj ∈ clK := {cl1, cl2, ..., clK}. Any coalition
of clustered players is defined as clU ⊆ clK. While running
the cooperative game model for the clustered players, we
assign to each clustered player the sum of all its member
prosumers’ original consumption and generation profiles as
its own consumption and generation, and all of its member
prosumers’ ES systems as its own ES capacity.
In other words, we follow the following steps to implement
this cooperative game model with clustered players.
1) Load processing: we gather all the model inputs, includ-
ing the number of prosumers N , their net load profiles
q : qit, where i ∈ [1, N ], t ∈ [1, R], and their ES system
constraints. We calculate the coalitional energy cost for
the grand coalition C(N ) following (1), and record the
optimized ES operation as b∗ : b∗it.
2) Prosumer clustering: we construct each prosumer’s load
profile as a result of the cooperative energy management
in the grand coalition: l∗ : l∗it = qit + b
∗
it. The K-means
clustering model detailed in Algorithm 1 is then run
with l∗ as inputs, along with a chosen K. We obtain
the clustering assignment a : ai = j | i ∈ clj ,∀i ∈ N .
Therefore, for any player i, the cluster it belongs to can
be notated as clai .
3) Clustered player cooperative game formulation: in order
to preserve as much of the original inputs as possible,
we apply all the prosumers’ load and ES inputs directly
to the clustered player coalitions. Therefore, for any
coalition of clustered players clU ⊆ clK, the total energy
cost is defined as
FclU (b) =
R∑
t=1
{
pbt
∑
clai∈clU
[qit + bit]
+
+ pst
∑
clai∈clU
[qit + bit]
−
}
This way we convert all the clustered player inputs to the
original prosumers’ inputs, so we are able to use (1) to
compute the coalitional energy costs for all the clustered
player coalitions C(clU ). Using a similar conversion, the
value of clustered player coalitions can be calculated as
v(clU ) =
∑
clai∈clU
C({i})− C(clU )
The nucleolus of this clustered player cooperative game
u : uclj ,∀clj ∈ clK can then be computed by iteratively
minimizing the excess of the clustered player coalitions
[14].
4) De-clustering: the nucleolus computed for the clus-
tered players needs to be distributed to their member
prosumers. Different from the full prosumer cooper-
ative model where the value for each coalition of a
single prosumer v({i}) = 0,∀i ∈ N , the in-cluster
cooperation sometimes results in v({clj}) > 0. This
can be considered additional savings for each clustered
player that also needs to be distributed to its member
prosumers. Although advanced allocation methods can
be developed, to set a benchmark, here we distribute the
energy savings to each prosumer within a cluster simply
in proportion to the absolute value of each individual’s
energy cost without cooperation:
x : xi = [uclai + v({clai})](|C({i})|/
∑
i∈clj
|C({i})|)
K-means clustering reduces the number of coalitions of the
cooperative game from 2N to 2K , where K ≤ N . Considering
K can theoretically take on any value we choose, we now have
full control of the model’s computation complexity. Intuitively,
the lower K is, the more information the model loses, impact-
ing the model’s accuracy. An example is discussed in the case
studies.
IV. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we incorporate clustering in our prosumer
cooperative game for two case studies. We use domestic
load data measured in the Customer-Led Network Revolution
trials1. We select a time frame of 24 hours starting from the
midnight of a sunny summer day in July. The PV generation
data is simulated in PVWatts 2 using a 4kW, fixed 20 degree
tilt residential system, and the London Gatwick solar data.
The ES model has an energy capacity of 7 kWh, a maximum
charge power of 3.5 kW, a maximum discharge power of
3.2 kW, both charge and discharge efficiencies of 95%, an
initial state of charge of 50%, and a state of charge range
of 20-95%. We assume PV and ES are adopted by 50% of
the prosumers respectively, and both ownerships are randomly
assigned independently of each other. In other words, each
prosumer can have a PV system, or an ES system, or both,
or neither. The energy import price follows a UK Economy 7
residential rate structure: £0.072/kWh for midnight–7am, and
1http://www.networkrevolution.co.uk/resources/project-library/
2http://pvwatts.nrel.gov/pvwatts.php
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Fig. 2. Plots of 150 prosumers’ (a) load consumption alone, (b) net load with PV without ES operation, (c) net load with PV and ES optimized for the grand
coalition, (d) joint loads with and without cooperative ES operation, (e) 8 centroid net load profiles with ES optimized for the grand coalition.
TABLE I
CLUSTERING RESULTS BY DER
Clustered player 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
No. of prosumers 10 28 7 9 22 6 30 38
No. of PV units 10 28 0 9 22 0 4 2
No. of ES systems 10 0 0 0 22 4 2 37
£0.1681/kWh for 7am–midnight3, and the energy export price
is the UK feed-in tariff4 fixed at £0.0485/kWh.
A. Model with a Large Number of Prosumers
We run the clustering model for large numbers of players
(14 ≤ N ≤ 200) to test its effectiveness in grouping
prosumers based on their DER mix and reducing computation
time. Fig. 2 shows an example of clustering 150 prosumers
into 8 groups following the steps detailed in Section III-B.
Increasing the number of clusters can improve the accuracy of
the nucleolus estimation, but it will also result in an increase in
the computation time. In order to maintain a balance between
the two, we chose 8 clusters, double the number of the types
of energy resource mix (i.e. no PV or ES, only PV, only ES,
and both PV and ES).
Table I shows the DER distribution in the clusters. It
can be clearly observed that clustering effectively separated
prosumers with different types of DER; Clustered Player 1, 5
3https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/annual-domestic-
energy-price-statistics
4https://www.gov.uk/feed-in-tariffs/overview
TABLE II
MODEL COMPUTATION TIME [S]
No. prosumers 8 10 14 50 100 200
w/o clustering 13 77 3E+4 N/A N/A N/A
with 8 clusters 13 24 54 6E+2 5E+3 3E+4
consist of prosumers with both PV and ES, Clustered Player 2,
4 with only PV, Clustered Player 3, 7 mostly without PV or ES,
Clustered Player 6, 8 mostly with only ES. Table II compares
the computation time5 between the model with clustering
and the model without clustering. It shows that the model
without clustering requires about 10 hours to compute for a 14-
prosumer game, whereas the model with clustering can solve
a 200-prosumer game within the same amount of time.
B. Full Model vs. Model with Clustering
In this case study, we aim to verify the accuracy of a
model with clustering by comparing its results to a full model.
Due to the computational limitation of a full model, we can
only conduct the comparison with a relatively low number of
prosumers. Here we select 14 prosumers with exactly the same
load and DER inputs for both models, and 5 clusters for the
model with clustering. Again, 5 was chosen as the number of
clusters to balance the accuracy and computational time.
5Running on Apple iMac with a processor of 2.8 GHz Intel Core i5 and a
memory module of 16 GB 1867 MHz DDR3
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Fig. 3 displays the energy costs, cost savings from both
cooperating within the clusters and the final imputation (i.e.
nucleolus). It can be seen that all the clustered players are
guaranteed savings, and the savings from cooperating within
the clusters are significantly lower than the nucleolus, which
further confirms that the clustering process tends to group
prosumers that exhibit similar behaviors together.
Fig. 4 compares the two sets of nucleolus calculated in
both models. Each marker represents a prosumer, and they
all fall very close to the diagonal line regardless of the player
DER mix, which means the payoff allocation computed from
clustering is a good estimation of the nucleolus computed
through a full model. The result discrepancies here are mainly
due to the ‘lumping’ effect of clustering, which is unable
to capture the individual contributions of each player. More
advanced de-clustering techniques can be developed for the
re-distribution of payoff among each cluster to improve the
estimation accuracy.
V. CONCLUSION
To overcome the computational challenge in the cooperative
P2P energy sharing scheme, we incorporated K-means clus-
tering in the model. It was shown to effectively sort prosumers
into groups that were representative of each individual’s con-
tribution to the cooperation. As a result, the computation time
was significantly reduced and the model with clustering was
able to solve for 200 players within the time a full model
would take for 14 players. The payoff allocation derived
from our benchmark clustering and de-clustering methods was
shown to be very close to the nucleolus calculated in the full
model. Considering prosumer’s generation and consumption
vary on a daily basis, it is unlikely for a player or coalition to
be under-compensated consistently that would give it an in-
centive to become independent. Further analyses are needed to
confirm this hypothesis. A natural extension of this work is to
further customize the clustering and de-clustering techniques
so that the modified cooperative game model can be applied to
larger numbers of prosumers while maintaining the incentives
for the participants at a similar level as the full model.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Han, T. Morstyn, and M. McCulloch, “Incentivizing prosumer coali-
tions with energy management using cooperative game theory,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 303–313, Jan 2019.
[2] Y. Parag and B. K. Sovacool, “Electricity market design for the prosumer
era,” Nature Energy, no. March, p. 16032, 2016.
[3] T. Morstyn, B. Hredzak, R. P. Aguilera, and V. G. Agelidis, “Model pre-
dictive control for distributed microgrid battery energy storage systems,”
IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, vol. 26, no. 3, pp.
1107–1114, May 2018.
[4] L. Jia and L. Tong, “Dynamic pricing and distributed energy manage-
ment for demand response,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 7,
no. 2, pp. 1128–1136, March 2016.
[5] T. Morstyn, A. Teytelboym, and M. D. Mcculloch, “Bilateral contract
networks for peer-to-peer energy trading,” IEEE Transactions on Smart
Grid, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 2026–2035, March 2019.
[6] W. Saad, Z. Han, H. V. Poor, and T. Basar, “Game-theoretic methods
for the smart grid: An overview of microgrid systems, demand-side
management, and smart grid communications,” IEEE Signal Processing
Magazine, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 86–105, Sept 2012.
[7] L. S. Shapley, “Cores of convex games,” International Journal of Game
Theory, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 11–26, 1971.
[8] J. Castro, D. Go´mez, and J. Tejada, “Polynomial calculation of the
Shapley value based on sampling,” Computers and Operations Research,
vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 1726–1730, 2009.
[9] J. K. Sankaran, “On finding the nucleolus of an n-person cooperative
game,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 329–
338, 1991.
[10] G. Chicco, R. Napoli, and F. Piglione, “Comparisons among clustering
techniques for electricity customer classification,” IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 933–940, May 2006.
[11] F. Petitjean, A. Ketterlin, and P. Ganc¸arski, “A global averaging method
for dynamic time warping, with applications to clustering,” Pattern
Recognition, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 678–693, 2011.
[12] T. Chen, K. Qian, A. Mutanen, B. Schuller, P. Jarventausta, and W. Su,
“Classification of electricity customer groups towards individualized
price scheme design,” 2017 North American Power Symposium, NAPS
2017, no. 1, pp. 4–7, 2017.
[13] Y. Zhou, J. Wu, and C. Long, “Evaluation of peer-to-peer energy sharing
mechanisms based on a multiagent simulation framework,” Applied
Energy, vol. 222, no. February, pp. 993–1022, 2018.
[14] L. Han, T. Morstyn, and M. McCulloch, “Constructing prosumer coali-
tions for energy cost savings using cooperative game theory,” in 2018
Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC), June 2018, pp. 1–7.
[15] E. Baeyens, E. Y. Bitar, P. P. Khargonekar, and K. Poolla, “Coalitional
aggregation of wind power,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 3774–3784, 2013.
[16] M. Meila˘, “The uniqueness of a good optimum for k-means,” in
Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Machine Learning,
ser. ICML ’06. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2006, pp. 625–632.
